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Death at Sea: A Sad Tale of Disaster, Injustice, and
Unnecessary Risk
Thomas C Galligan,Jr.*
PREFACE

I have written or co-written many articles for publication in law
reviews. Some of them have been traditional legal scholarship (law
review articles), and some have taken alternative forms, such as
dialogues and remembrances. This Article will essentially be
traditional legal scholarship; it will present several maritime law
issues that impact the rights of the people affected by the
Deepwater Horizon disaster. In the style of the traditional law
review article it will explain the applicable legal rules, trace them
to a respectable extent, and argue for their repeal or amendment,
based on justice, history, contemporary views, and consistency (the
idea that sufficiently similar people in sufficiently similar
situations should be treated the same). Thus, for the reader, this
will be a traditional law review article. But, in the interests of
honesty and transparency, I provide this Preface to give the reader
some additional personal context. Thus, you may view it as full
disclosure. It is that, in part; but it is also my effort to memorialize
my experiences and to present my views and arguments against the
backdrop in which they were honed and initially expressed vis-Aivis the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
While teaching torts (and other courses) at Louisiana State
University (LSU) Law Center during the very late 1980s through
1996,1 1 was also a consultant with the Louisiana Trial Lawyers'
Association (LTLA), now the Louisiana Association of Justice
(LAJ). Working with that organization, I consulted and testified on
various legislative proposals relating to tort law. I also wrote a
column in the LTLA newsletter and wrote case summaries of
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President and Professor of Humanities, Colby-Sawyer College. I am
grateful to Professor David Robertson, who reviewed an early draft of the
written statement submitted to the House Judiciary Committee, on which
subsequent statements and this Article are based, and who made many helpful
and insightful comments. I am also in debt to my son, Patrick Galligan, who
read, edited, and commented on many drafts of the various statements.
1. 1 taught at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at LSU from 1986-1998. I
worked with the LTLA from 1988-1996. In 1996, I was appointed Executive
*

Director of the Louisiana Judicial College, at which point I stopped consulting

with the LTLA.
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Louisiana appellate court 2 tort decisions. During that period and
thereafter, I have been fortunate to speak on tort issues at LTLA
and LAJ seminars. But it was during that time, while giving a
speech on Louisiana tort law 4 to an LTLA audience in (as I recall)
Lafayette, that a lawyer asked me a question that was becoming
increasingly common: "Will that be or is that the law in
admiralty?" The question arose from the basic fact that many
Louisiana tort lawyers have significant maritime personal injury
practices and from the reality that admiralty law can be an
amalgam of federal and state substantive law thanks to the
"maritime but local doctrine."5 But I could not answer the
question, because I was not then an expert in maritime law.
Frustrated by my ignorance, I sought advice from my alwaysreliable friend and mentor, Frank Maraist, who, coincidentally,
taught admiralty at LSU and was (and remains) one of the nation's
and State of Louisiana's foremost admiralty experts. Frank told me
that the best solution was for me to teach admiralty because
teaching it meant that I would have to learn it; thereafter, I would
be able to answer the "is that the law in admiralty" question. Or at
least I would be able to make an educated law professor guess.
When I protested that Frank taught admiralty, he told me that he
would step aside for one year for me to teach the course. He also
said that if I enjoyed teaching admiralty, as he promised I would,
we would alternate years or find some other appropriate solution.
Naturally, Frank was right. I loved admiralty-a love that led,
with Frank's generosity, to co-authorships with Frank on books
and articles and opportunities to speak and write alone and with
others as well. That love has continued through the years; it went
with me to the University of Tennessee and then came with me to
Colby-Sawyer College in New London, New Hampshire. Over the
years that love has been the reason I have continued to write and
speak about maritime matters to lawyers and judges.
When the Deepwater Horizon exploded on April 20, 2010, I
followed with great concern and interest because of my connection
to Louisiana and my connection to maritime law. My involvement
2. Of course, I also included relevant U.S. Fifth Circuit decisions and U.S.
Supreme Court decisions affecting Louisiana tort law.
3. I have also spoken at seminars in Louisiana sponsored by other
organizations including the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel, the
Louisiana Judicial College (of which I was Executive Director from 19961998), and the Louisiana State Bar Association.
4. The precise topic involved the recently passed Louisiana Product
Liability Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-.60 (2009).
5. See FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR. & CATHERINE
MARAIST, ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 8-10 (6th ed. 2010).
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grew when my friend Richard Arsenault asked me to organize and
co-chair, with him, a Louisiana State Bar Association program
concerning the Deepwater Horizon and potential legal issues
arising therefrom. I readily agreed, and while sitting at my desk,
thinking about that program, I got an email from a staff member
with the House Judiciary Committee asking if I would be willing
to talk with her and a colleague about various legal issues that
might arise in light of the ongoing disaster. During that call I was
invited to testify before the committee concerning the rights of the
survivors of the 11 workers killed when the rig exploded and
related matters. In preparation for that testimony, I prepared a draft
statement concerning the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA),
the Jones Act, and the Limitation of Liability Act, among other
things. I urged the House to amend or repeal portions of the
statutes noted above. That statement is the basis of this Article. 6
Later, I was invited to testify before the Senate Judiciary
Committee and then the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation.7 Before those committees I once again
discussed the statutes noted above, as well as maritime punitive
damages and the overall climate of risk at sea.
Over the course of the summer, I met many people and learned
much. Of all the people I met, no one made a greater impression on
me than Keith Jones, a Baton Rouge lawyer, whose son, Gordon,
was killed when the rig exploded. Gordon was survived by several
family members, including his wife, Michelle, a young son, and
another son born days after Gordon's death. His story is tragic and
I feel almost as if I am invading the family's privacy by relating it.
However, I tell it because of the impression Keith Jones made on
me and on so many other Americans who either saw him testify or
saw him on television, explaining how unfair, out-of-date, and
inconsistent American maritime law had become and how that fact
adversely affected his daughter-in-law and his grandsons. Keith
Jones is a person of courage, determination, intelligence, and
passion. It was an honor to get to know him. What he and the other
surviving relatives sought was justice. Why? Because the loss of a
family member is a real loss-a real loss beyond any pecuniary
loss suffered. It is a real loss because nothing can bring back a lost
relative. Chris Jones, Gordon's brother, and-like his father-a
6. In addition to the written statement, I offered oral testimony-which is
limited to five minutes-and answered questions. Logistically, the biggest
challenge for me regarding the testimony was making sure it was only five
minutes long and still captured the essential issues.
7. In the interests of full disclosure, I paid the costs of my transportation
and hotel rooms while in Washington, D.C. to testify before Congress.

790

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

Baton Rouge lawyer, eloquently spoke for all of the 11 families
who lost a loved one on the Deepwater Horizon, when he testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee and said: "Mr. Hayward, I
want my brother back." But there is nothing that can bring Gordon
back; all that is left is justice, and aspects of that, as explained
below, are hollow. Indeed injustice echoes through American
maritime law.
Over the summer, I worked to change the aspects of current
American law that deny full recovery to the surviving family
members of those killed in a maritime disaster, like the Deepwater
Horizon. Although the House of Representatives quickly passed
measures that would have provided a fuller, more just recovery to
the surviving family members of those killed, the Senate, as of this
writing, has not done so. In this piece, I turn from the halls of
Congress to the pages of this great law review to establish a brief
for change and a call for justice.
In the meantime, I recently read in U.S.A. Today that Kenneth
Feinberg, the administrator of the $20 billion Gulf Oil fund,
believes that the future for the Gulf after the spill, in environmental
terms, is better than expected.8 He stated that he believed that the
$20 billion fund should be more than enough to cover claims.9
Although I certainly hope Mr. Feinberg is right on both counts, I
also know that there are 11 families whose lives will never again
be whole, no matter how much time goes by and no matter how
those families journey through the grieving process. I am also
aware that no matter how adequate the $20 billion fund is, current
law is woefully inadequate to compensate those families for their
loss. It is to those issues and their overall impact on maritime law
and maritime risk that I now turn.

I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, a movable drilling
rig owned by Transocean and working on behalf of a group that
included BP, exploded, killing 11 men and causing oil to spew and
spread through the Gulf of Mexico toward land. The ensuing
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico resulted in death, injury,
environmental devastation, and economic loss to individuals,
businesses, and governmental entities. It was the most publicized

8. Oren Dorell, Chiefof BP FundSays FullRecovery Likely for Gulf USA
TODAY, Dec. 21, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2010-12-20-feinberg-oil-spill-fundN.htm.
9. Id.
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oil field disaster since the Exxon Valdez debacle off the coast of
Alaska.
The staggering consequences of the Deepwater Horizon spill
force America and the world to ask whether applicable United
States laws are fair, consistent, and up to date. Do they provide
adequate compensation to the victims of maritime and
environmental disasters? And do those laws provide economic
actors with proper incentives to ensure efficient investments in
accident avoidance activities? Does the law appropriately hold
tortfeasors accountable? Sadly, an analysis of the relevant laws
reveals a climate of limited liability and undercompensation.
The law undercompensates, in part, because the Jones Act and
DOHSA, as interpreted, do not provide damages to the survivors of
Jones Act seamen and most others killed in high seas maritime
disasters for the loss of care, comfort, and companionship suffered
as a result of their loved ones' deaths. Thus at the core of
America's undercompensatory maritime liability regime are two
outdated statutes passed in 1920 that provide what is today miserly
recovery for wrongful death. The limited recovery provided by the
Jones Act and DOHSA are out of step with the majority American
rule. And due to an exception in DOHSA and the difference
between the legal treatment of a rig and a fixed platform, the entire
system is internally inconsistent to such an extent that it is
nonsensical, further adding to a regime of inconsistency, which
will be explained further below.
Aggravating the situation and furthering the problem of
undercompensation, as noted below, some courts have
inappropriately relied on those recovery-denying wrongful death
rules to further limit recovery of nonpecuniary damages in other
maritime cases to which the Jones Act and DOHSA do not, by
their terms, expressly apply. These failures to fully compensate
victims raise basic issues of fairness and corrective justice. Is it
right, consistent with modern law and values, and just to deny
recovery for very real damages such as the loss of care, comfort,
and companionship one suffers when a loved one is killed?
In addition, and critically, the failure to compensate raises
important issues concerning tort law, deterrence, and
accountability. If the law undercompensates the victims of tortious
behavior, then economic actors, when deciding what to do and how
to do it, face less than the total costs of their activities. This
economic reality will, in turn and inevitably, lead to
underdeterrence and increased risk. If the law does not hold people
accountable, the risk of injury, death, and damage increases. The
economist will persuasively point out that this combination of
undercompensation and underdeterrence will cause increased risk

792

LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 71

and suboptimal levels (more than desired) of personal injury in any
industry in which they prevail, including the maritime oil and gas
industry.
In the maritime setting, the climate of limitation is exacerbated
by the existence of the 1851 Ship Owner's Limitation of Liability
Act. That law allows a ship owner to limit its liability to the postdisaster value of a vessel, providing the relevant events occurred
without the privity or knowledge of the ship owner. Predictably
and rationally, the relevant maritime actor who knows it will be
able to limit its liability will not take optimal precautions because
it does not face all of the costs of its activities.
Although punitive damages might make up for the lack of
deterrence in some areas, the deterrent role of punitive damages in
admiralty is less significant because of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,o which limited the
recovery of punitive damages to compensatory damages in many
maritime cases to a 1:1 ratio (between the punitive damages and
the compensatory damages).
What does it all add up to? The sum total is a liability regime in
which victims of tortious behavior are treated neither fairly nor
consistently. That tragic reality means that maritime actors, when
deciding what to do and how to do it, do not face all the accident or
risk costs that their conduct presents, resulting in more risk than is
optimal. More risk inevitably leads to more injury, which by
definition results in repeated instances of undercompensation. Thus
the vicious cycle continues. Congressional action amending the
Jones Act and DOHSA to allow recovery of damages to the
survivors of those killed in maritime high seas disasters would
begin the process of necessary legal repair. The proposed
amendments would also undermine the decisions that have
inappropriately extended the reach of the Jones Act and DOHSA,
because those decisions rely upon the limits on recovery in those
statutes to provide further limits on recovery. Full compensation to
the survivors of those killed in maritime disasters would, in turn,
mean maritime actors would be forced to consider all of the costs
of their actions when deciding what to do and how to do it,
resulting in a safer world where the created risk approaches, rather
than exceeds, optimal limits. Full and effective reform should also
include repeal or amendment of the Limitation of Liability Act and
a reexamination of the maritime punitive damages rule articulated
in Baker.
I will begin my analysis with a discussion of the legal fact that
the surviving family members of many (but not all) who are killed
10. 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008).
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in maritime disasters on the high seas are not entitled to recover
loss of society damages. In failing to allow recovery of loss of
society damages-damages for loss of care, comfort, or
companionship-maritime law is contrary to the rule prevailing in
the majority of the states." Consequently, maritime law
undercompensates the surviving families of seamen and those
killed in high seas maritime tort disasters, and it does so in a way
that is out of step with the majority rule in America.12 Second, I
will discuss the extension of the seamen and high seas no-loss-ofsociety recovery rules to other maritime cases, which extension
further limits potential overall liability. Third, I will describe the
anomalous high seas wrongful death rule that pre-death pain and
suffering damages are not recoverable in maritime survival
actions. Fourth, I will briefly explain how undercompensation
can lead to underdeterrence and increased risk. Next, I will address
the maritime doctrine of limitation of liability.14 Finally, I will
review the impact of maritime punitive damages rules on risk and
deterrence.' 5
II. Loss OF SOCIETY IN MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH CASESSEAMEN AND THE HIGH SEAS

Loss of society damages are not recoverable in Jones Act
wrongful death cases or in any case, other than a commercial
aviation disaster, where death occurs on the high seas. This harsh
legal reality is inconsistent with modem American law and does
not fully or fairly compensate survivors for losses arising from the
maritime wrongful death of a loved one. It is also inconsistent with
11. Katherine J. Santon, The Worth of a Human Life, 85 N.D. L. REv. 123,
130-31 (2009).
12. As noted, this past summer Congress had the chance and ability to
change this state of affairs by amending the relevant statutes. The House of
Representatives did exactly that in passing H.R. 5503. Various Senate bills,
taken together, would have made the relevant changes, but the Senate did not
pass them. For instance, Senator Leahy's proposed Survivor's Equality Act of
2010, S. 3463, would have appropriately amended DOHSA to make loss of
society damages recoverable.
13. The House bill, H.R. 5503, made the necessary changes, and S. 3463
would also have done so but was not passed. See supra note 12.
14. Once again, the House bill, H.R. 5503, made the necessary changes,
repealing aspects of the Limitation of Liability Act. Senator Schumer's proposed
bill, S. 3478, would have repealed the relevant provisions of the limitation act to
assure more adequate compensation and deterrence, but it was not passed.
15. Senator Whitehouse's proposed bill on maritime punitive damages, S.
3345, would improve those punitive damages rules by restoring the traditional
ability to tailor a punitive award to the facts of the case.
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the applicable law governing recovery against a third party-not
the decedent's employer' 6 -on a fixed platform and arguably
inconsistent with the applicable law in territorial waters. As noted,
this no-recovery rule is also inconsistent with the more progressive
recovery available in high seas commercial aviation disasters, a
reality that makes the entire high seas recovery regime nonsensical.
A. Seamen
The analytical starting point in any workplace maritime tort
case is to determine whether an injured or deceased person is or
was a seaman, because his status determines the legal rights of the
claimant and his family members. A seaman is a person who does
the work of a vessel' 7 and who has an employment-related
connection to a vessel that is substantial in duration (more than
30% of one's work time is spent on a vessel or fleet of commonly
owned or controlled vessels) and nature (the worker is exposed to
the perils of the sea).' 9 Maritime law treats a semi-submersible
drilling rig as a vessel.2 0 Moreover, a moveable drilling rig is a
vessel because it is "capable of being used . . . as a means of

transportation on water." 2 1 The Deepwater Horizon was a
moveable drilling rig and, therefore, under maritime law, it was a
vessel. Interestingly, a permanently attached drilling platform, as
opposed to a semi-submersible drilling rig, is not a vessel, and we
will return to the inequities that might arise from that distinction
below.
Assuming that the Deepwater Horizon was a vessel, workers
with a substantial employment-related connection to the
Deepwater Horizon would be seamen. A seaman has several
possible claims against his or her employer: (1) the right to recover
16. The survivors would, under most federal and state workers'
compensation schemes, be entitled to a no fault death benefit from the employer
but would not be entitled to recover in tort. See MARAIST, GALLIGAN &
MARAIST, supra note 5, at 288-91 (discussing benefits under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)). The survivors would be
entitled to recover in tort from a third party and, as noted, this recovery would
include recovery from the third party for the survivors and loss of care, comfort,
and companionship. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the
Patterns ofLouisiana Workplace Torts, 55 LA. L. REv. 71, 91-95 (1994).
17. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991).
18. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 371 (1995).
19. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997).
20. Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Drilling Rig ROWAN/ODESSA, 761 F.2d
229, 233 (5th Cir. 1985).
21. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 489

(2005).
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maintenance and cure; (2) the right to recover for injuries caused
by the unseaworthiness of the vessel on which he or she served (a
vessel is unseaworthy if it presents an unreasonabl1 unsafe
condition to the seamen on board); and (3) a Jones Act'" right to
recover in negligence against his or her employer. 23
1. Jones Act Negligence
The Jones Act incorporates the relevant provisions of the
Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA)-the right to recover in
negligence from the employer, comparative fault, etc. 24 The Jones
Act (through the FELA) provides certain survivors of seamen
killed as a result of their employers' negligence with wrongful
death and survival action claims against their employers. Basically,
a wrongful death action is an action that compensates certain
beneficiaries for the loss they suffer as a result of the death of the
victim. In most jurisdictions, a survival action provides recovery
for the damages that the decedent suffered before his death. Let me
begin with the available wrongful death remedies.
Critically, what do the recoverable damages include and what
do they not include in a Jones Act negligence wrongful death
action? The survivors of a deceased seaman whose death was
caused by his employer's negligence can recover any loss of
economic support, any lost services, and other traditional types of
pecuniary damages. That is, the surviving family members recover
purely economic losses. The survivors cannot recover loss of
society damages. That is, they cannot recover for the loss of care,
comfort, or companionship that they suffer as a result of the
tortiously caused death. To restate, loss of society damages are, in
essence, those damages survivors suffer as a result of the fact that
the deceased is no longer alive and there to share the joys of life
with the survivors. Thus, in a Jones Act wrongful death action, a
seaman's surviving spouse may recover any loss of support (net of
taxes and what the decedent would have spent on himself) and loss
of service, such as cooking or painting or cutting the lawn, and any
other economic damages. But the spouse recovers nothing for the
22.

46 U.S.C. § 30104 (Supp. 2009).

23. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., ADMIRALTY IN A
NUTSHELL 194-99 (5th ed. 2005).
24. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).

25. There are various approaches to setting an economic value on a human
life, whatever the value of a person's relationship with others. Of course, the
various approaches may yield different conclusions as to that economic value. See
Associated Press, How to Value Life? EPA Devalues Its Estimate, MSNBC.COM
(July 10, 2008, 4:34 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25626294/.
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loss of the relationship. And if the spouse cannot prove any
resulting economic loss, the spouse would recover nothing.
Likewise, a parent who is not financially dependent upon a child
who is killed would recover nothing whether that child is an adult
or a small child.
The inability of a seaman's survivors to recover loss of society
damages in the negligence action does not result from the language
of the Jones Act or the FELA. Rather, it is the result of the
combination of the 1913 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Michigan
CentralRailroadCo. v. Vreeland,2 6 which refused to recognize the
right to recover loss of society damages under the FELA (and
which actually predated the passage of the Jones Act by seven
years), and the Court's reliance on that decision in Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp.,27 which will be discussed in further detail below.
One might arguably understand and appreciate the Vreeland
holding in an era when the law of wrongful death was still in its
relative infancy; human life spans were shorter, and given the state
of technology, industry, and law, accidental death was a more
common (albeit still tragic) part of the American landscape than it
is today. However, to deny recovery of loss of society damages in
a wrongful death case today is out of the legal mainstream; it is a
throwback to a past era. Barring recovery for loss of society is a
legal message that in cases where the rule applies, the relationship
itself has no value, other than its pecuniary or economic value. The
no-recovery rule communicates to a spouse or parent that, to the
law, the relationship between spouses or between parents and
children is a purely economic relationship; it communicates the
message that the loss of love, care, comfort, and companionship is
incidental to the economic relationship, that it is incapable of being
valued, and, therefore, that it is worthless. This is a harsh message
that is totally inconsistent with modem reality and values.
Moreover it is inconsistent with the majority rule on land, which
as noted, provides that loss of society is recoverable in a
wrongful death action. A spouse, child, parent, or sibling of a
seaman killed in a maritime disaster suffers a very real loss of
society, and the law should recognize it.
Congress could easily bring the law governing the right of the
survivors of a seaman to recover for the seaman's wrongful death
26. 227 U.S. 59, 74 (1913).

27. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
28. See supra note 12. In some states, this result is achieved by expressly
recognizing the right to recover loss of society as nonpecuniary damages. In
others, courts interpret local statutes that allow recovery of pecuniary damages
to also include loss of society damages.
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into step with modem conceptions of family relationships and into
conformity with the majority land-based rule by amending the
FELA wrongful death statute 9 to state that recovery by a named
beneficiary in a wrongful death action shall "include nonpecuniary
damages for loss of care, comfort, and companionship." That
amendment would bring the Jones Act and the FELA into line with
modem tort law regarding the recovery of damages in wrongful
death cases, as well as the economic, social, and familial realities
of today.30
2. Unseaworthiness

Moving from the negligence claim31 for wrongful death to the
unseaworthiness claim for wrongful death, the general maritime
29. 45 U.S.C. §51 (2006).
30. The House of Representatives passed Representative Conyer's Securing
Protections for the Injured from Limitations on Liability Act, H.R. 5503, which
did exactly that.
31. The Jones Act supplies the seaman (and his or her survivors) with a
negligence action against the employer. See MARAIST, GALLIGAN & MARAIST,
supra note 5, at 247-48. As a result of workers' compensation laws, most landbased employees do not have the right to recover in negligence against their
employer. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 395, at 1104 (2001). They
have the right to recover workers' compensation, and in a death case, their
survivors would recover a workers' compensation death benefit from the
employer. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT

LAW § 11.06, at 11-29 to 11-30 (2004 ed., Supp. 2010). The workers'
compensation claim is a no fault claim and, therefore, by definition recovery
does not require a showing of employer fault. Id. In return for this no fault
recovery right, the employee (and his or her survivors) loses his or her right to
recover in negligence from the employer. 2 DOBBS, supra, § 395, at 1104. This
legal result is accomplished by providing the employer immunity from
negligence actions. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra,

§ 11.06, at 11-29 to 11-30.

The no fault recovery is less than total tort recovery-it is commonly medical
expenses plus two-thirds of lost wages, plus potentially a scheduled amount
depending upon the type of injury. 2 DOBBS, supra, § 392, at 1098-99. By
providing a negligence action against the employer, one might say that the Jones
Act (and FELA) is more generous than the generally applicable law because it
provides the potential for full tort recovery. Of course, the seaman does not have
an unfettered right to no fault benefits-his or her no fault right to recover for
maintenance and cure or unseaworthiness is subject to the judicially developed
maritime law. See MARAIST, GALLIGAN & MARAIST, supra note 5, at 220-46.

Moreover, in a Jones Act case, the seaman (and his or her survivors) has a
relaxed burden of proving causation. Id. at 254. This reduced burden is
definitely a benefit to the plaintiff. As a result, one might contend that the
negligence action coupled with the relaxed burden of proof concerning causation
is some sort of tradeoff for full recovery in a wrongful death action. However, it
is worth noting that there is no support for that trade-off contention in the
legislative history of the Jones Act.
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law provides certain survivors of a seaman with wrongful death
and survival actions against a vessel owner (or operator under
many circumstances) if the seaman is killed as a result of the
vessel's unseaworthiness. If the death occurs on the high seas, then
DOHSA 3 2 governs the recoverable wrongful death damages arising
from the vessel's unseaworthiness. Passed in 1920, like the Jones
Act, DOHSA expressly limits recovery to "pecuniary loss." 33
Thus, the survivors of seamen killed as a result of a vessel's
unseaworthy condition on the high seas may not recover loss of
society damages. Consequently, the spouse, parent, or child, who
has no claim for pecuniary damages, recovers nothing for the
losses caused by the death of a loved one, and all of the issues
raised concerning the inequity, incongruity, and antiquated nature
of that limitation on recovery discussed above in conjunction with
the Jones Act apply to DOHSA.
B. The Rest of Us
Up to this point, I have focused on the rights a seaman's
survivors have for death caused by negligence under the Jones Act
and for death caused by an unseaworthy condition on the high seas
under DOHSA. 34 That focus arose out of the fact that the genesis
of this Article was the Deepwater Horizon disaster and at least
some of the 11 people killed on board were most certainly seamen.
However, it is now appropriate to step back and make a very
important analytical point about DOHSA. DOHSA applies to the
survivors of anyone killed on the high seas and the survivors of
anyone who suffers fatal inury on the high seas, even if the death
itself later occurs on land. Thus, for example, DOHSA governs
the rights of the survivors of a person tortiously killed on a cruise
ship on the high seas. Moreover, by way of another example,
DOHSA governs the rights of survivors of those killed in the
territorial waters of a foreign sovereign. DOHSA applies to both
define recovery and deny recovery of loss of society damages in
any high seas wrongful death case. 3 Thus, the limited wrongful
death recovery available under DOHSA affects not only the
32. 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).
33. Id. § 30303.
34. The beneficiaries of a seaman killed on the high seas may have claims
not only against the vessel but may also have general maritime tort claims
against other parties, such as manufacturers, contractors, or others. See generally
MARAIST, GALLIGAN & MARAIST, supra note 5, at 163-82.
35. Motts v. M/V GREEN WAVE, 210 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2000).
36. DOHSA applies, that is, other than in a Jones Act, negligence wrongful
death case.
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survivors of seamen who are killed as a result of a high seas
unseaworthy condition but also all the rest of us as well. Hereafter,
I will weave the rights of the survivors of seamen with the rights of
others because all survivors of those tortiously killed deserve a
full, fair, modem, and consistent recovery.
One DOHSA case worthy of note is Rux v. Republic of
Sudan,37 which chillingly presents the reach and operation of
DOHSA. There, 56 surviving family members of the 17 sailors
killed in the terrorist bombing of the USS Cole sued the Republic
of Sudan under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,3 8 alleging
that Sudan was at fault for providing material assistance and
support to al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the attack.3 9 The
court held that DOHSA applied because the deaths occurred in a
foreign port and nonpecuniary damages were not recoverable
under DOHSA. 4 0 Twenty-two family members, including parents
and siblings, recovered nothing as a result of the deaths even
though the court noted:
The court sympathizes greatly with plaintiffs, who continue
to suffer terribly years after their loved ones died. But the
court is bound to follow the legal precedent before it.
Congress makes the laws; courts merely interpret them.
Whether to amend DOHSA to allow more liberal recovery
in cases of death caused by terrorism on the high seas, as
Congress did in 2000 for cases of commercial aviation
accidents on the high seas, is a question for Congress alone.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' [intentional infliction of emotional
distress] and maritime wrongful death claims are dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 4 1
1. Inconsistenciesin Recovery
As noted in Rux, in addition to the general and very substantial
reasons to allow recovery of loss of society damages in DOHSA
cases, there is an additional analytical prong involving a 2000
37. 495 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2007), remanded, No. 07-1835 (4th Cir.
July 14, 2009).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006) (amended 2008).
39. Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
40. Id. at 563.
41. Id. at 565; see also Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461 (4th Cir.
2006); Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 672 F. Supp. 2d 726 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff'd in
part, 2011 WL 327275 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2011). See generally Ross M. Diamond,
Unequal Recoveryfor Death on the High Seas, TRIAL, Sept. 2009, at 34.
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amendment to DOHSA that points to the need to amend DOHSA.
But that inconsistency is only one of several involving the right to
recover for wrongful death in a maritime case. One already noted
above is the fact that where a tortious death occurs on land, the
majority rule is that loss of society damages are recoverable, but
not on the high seas. Now, let us turn to an inconsistency on the
high seas itself before considering several others.
a. The CommercialAviation DisasterException
In response to several highly publicized commercial airline
disasters-KAL 00742 and TWA 800-Congress amended
DOHSA to provide for recovery of nonpecuniary damages (loss of
care, comfort, and companionship) 43 for death resulting from "a
commercial aviation disaster occurring on the high seas beyond 12
nautical miles from the shore of the United States . . . but punitive

damages are not recoverable."" This 2000 amendment, which was
made retroactive to the day before one of the relevant air disasters,
brought DOHSA into the legal mainstream for the survivors of
victims of commercial aviation disasters. Clearly this amendment
was a step into the twenty-first century for the survivors of those
killed in commercial aviation disasters. But, although the survivors
of the victims of a commercial aviation disaster on the high seas
may now recover nonpecuniary damages, the survivors of anyone
else killed on the high seas may not. It strains reason to come up
with a meaningful, rational principle to justify the differential
treatment, other than the very real social and political turmoil that
followed the high profile tragic air disasters. But the solution
created a rather foolish inconsistency under DOHSA. The
Deepwater Horizon is, of course, a similarly tragic event, which
presented and still presents an opportunity for Congress to bring

42. The most noteworthy decision arising out of the KAL 007 disaster is,
perhaps, Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996). There, a
mother, who was not financially dependent upon her decedent daughter, sued
KAL for causing her daughter's death. The Court held that DOHSA applied to
the case, and because the statute limited recovery to pecuniary damages, the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Id. at 231.
43. 46 U.S.C. § 30307(a) (2006).
44. Id. § 30307(b). See generally Stephen R. Ginger & Will S. Skinner,
DOHSA's Commercial Aviation Exception: How Mass Airline Disasters
Influenced Congress on Compensationfor Deaths on the High Seas, 75 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 137 (2010) (discussing the legislation and the jurisprudence).
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the law into some logical, sensible, compassionate symmetry. To
date Congress has not done so.45
b. The Death of Workers, Who Are Not Seamen, on Territorial
Waters
As noted, when workers who are not seamen are killed as a
result of a maritime disaster on the high seas, DOHSA governs
their survivors' recovery, and that recovery is limited to pecuniary
damages, as currently defined.46 Concomitantly, if the non-seaman
worker's death occurs on territorial waters, nonpecuniary damages
would more likely be recoverable although defendants might
attempt to argue otherwise.4 7 Thus, where one dies may be more
relevant to recovery than other critical circumstances, such as the
work being performed or the nature of the injury to the relevant
survivors. These inconsistencies arising from location become
even more apparent when one considers death on the drilling
platform, as opposed to death on the rig.
c. DrillingPlatforms
If a worker is tortiously killed on a stationarydrillingplatform
located over the high seas, as opposed to a semisubmersible mobile
rig, state law will generally govern his tort recovery rights against
third persons.4 8 And state law very probably would mean survivors
would recover loss of society and pre-death pain and suffering
damages from third persons in a wrongful death action. This is
45. H.R. 5503 made the appropriate change. The Survivor's Equality Act of
2010, S. 3463, would have made loss of society damages recoverable for the
survivors of anyone killed on the high seas but was not passed.
46. As noted below, DOHSA applies to high seas wrongful death cases,
although the survivors of a seaman killed on the high seas as a result of the
employer's negligence would, as noted above, have a Jones Act wrongful death
claim against the employer arising out of the negligence (limited like the
DOHSA claim to pecuniary damages). Those seaman survivors would have a
DOHSA wrongful death claim arising out of any unseaworthiness against the
vessel owner. And DOHSA would govern their wrongful death recovery against
third persons. None of those claims would result in recovery of loss of society
damages under the current law.
47. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974) (allowing the
survivors of an LHWCA worker killed in territorial waters to recover loss of
society); see also Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1995)
(allowing the survivors of a non-seafarer killed in territorial waters to rely on
state law to seek recovery of loss of society damages).
48. As noted, workers' compensation law would govern the recovery from
the employer, which would generally be liable for a death benefit to certain
beneficiaries, and the employer would be immune from a tort action.
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because the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 49 adopts
the laws of the applicable adjacent state as the governing law on
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) platforms, which are treated as
islands in an upland state (recall that platforms, unlike rigs, are not
vessels).50 Thus the measure of recovery in a fatal injury action on
a high seas off-shore oil or gas production facility (a rig or
platform) would depend upon whether the relevant vehicle was a
platform or a rig, even though the job that the tortiously killed
worker was doing when injured and the functional cause of the
death were exactly the same. The point is that the potential
recovery would illogically and unfairly depend upon happenstance
rather than substance. Additionally, if the worker was killed on a
platform on territorial waters, state law would apply and the
worker's survivors would be entitled to recover loss of society
damages.
2. The Fix
Ironically, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.,51 first recognized a jurisprudential maritime
wrongful death cause of action, it did so because of inconsistencies
in the rights of the survivors of maritime workers to recover in
wrongful death actions. It acted to fill holes that the Jones Act and
DOHSA did not fill. Forty years after Moragne, inconsistencies
have both remained and multiplied. What are the inconsistencies?
Recovery for wrongful death, governed by state tort law, is usually
more generous when the death occurs on land than it is under the
Jones Act and DOHSA. Recovery for death arising from a
commercial aviation disaster on the high seas is more generous
than recovery for any other death occurring on the high seas and
governed by DOHSA. Recovery for wrongful death of non-seamen
workers 52 is probably more generous when the death occurs in
territorial waters as opposed to on the high seas. Recovery for
wrongful death is more generous if the death occurs on a platform
(whether the platform is located in territorial waters or on the high
seas) than when the death occurs on a rig. The solution is an
amendment to DOHSA.

49. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006).
50. See generally Alleman v. Omni Energy Servs. Corp., 580 F.3d 280 (5th
Cir. 2009); MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 23, at 323-27.
51. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
52. It might be even more accurate to say "non-seafarer" workers, as
opposed to "non-seaman" workers.
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I have noted above how a possible amendment to the Jones Act
would deal with the seaman's negligence claim; DOHSA could
also be amended to delete the word "pecuniary" before "loss" in 46
U.S.C. § 30303 and to add the language, "including nonpecuniary
damages for loss of care, comfort, and companionship" after
"loss."ss
3. An Additional Pointon Undercompensationand Consistency:
OPA 90
To add another relevant point to the analysis, the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA 90),54 passed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, allows victims of oil spills to recover various damages,
including removal costs,5 5 damage to real or personal property,
damage to natural resources used for subsistence,5 7 and economic
damages because of damage to property or natural resources even
if the claimant does not own the property.58 These rights to recover
damages assure compensation to persons injured in various ways
by an oil spill.
Critically, OPA 90 does not apply to personal injury or
wrongful death claims.5 9 It does not grant any right to recover for
personal injury or wrongful death arising out of an oil spill.
Consequently, the survivors of the seaman or others killed on the
high seas as a result of negligence or unseaworthiness do not
recover for loss of society, although persons whose property was
damaged or who lost profits do recover. This is not to say that
recovery for damaged property or lost profits is not appropriate; it
is merely to point out that currently recovery of economic loss is
more readily available than recovery for loss of a loved one.
Certainly, human life and personal injury are just as worthy of
compensation as property damage and economic loss.
III. EXPANDED UNDERCOMPENSATION

As noted above, the fact that the survivors of seamen and
anyone killed on the high seas cannot recover for loss of society
damages undercompensates them and is inconsistent with the
53. See supra note 45.
54. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2762 (2006).
55. Id. § 2702(b)(1).
56. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B).
57. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
58. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
59. See generally Gabarick v. Lauren Mar. (Am.), Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741
(E.D. La. 2009) (stating that OPA 90 does not cover bodily injury claims).
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current majority rule in America. However, some courts have
aggravated the situation. Some courts have extended the scope of
the Jones Act's and DOHSA's no-recovery rules beyond their
express reach and have applied them to limit or deny recovery in
other maritime contexts. In Moragne,60 the U.S. Supreme Court
created a general maritime law action for wrongful death that filled
some of the gaps in maritime wrongful death law and that provided
recovery in some cases not covered by DOHSA and the Jones Act.
As noted above, the Court created the general maritime wrongful
death action to fill holes in the law. Then in Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet,6 ' the Court held that the Moragne claim allowed
the survivors of an LHWCA worker killed in territorial waters to
recover loss of society damages. The Court's decision was
consistent with the modem American majority rule allowing
recovery of loss of society in wrongful death cases. 62 Thereafter,
the Court, in American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez,6 ' held that the
spouse of an injured longshore worker could recover for loss of
society and loss of consortium in a case where the worker was
injured but not killed.
However, two years before Alvez, the Court began a trend of
liability-limiting decisions ostensibly based on congressional
intent. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, the Court refused to
allow the survivors of someone killed on the high seas to rely upon
the Moragne claim to recover loss of society damages because
those damages were not recoverable under DOHSA. 6 The Court
decided that because Congress had spoken to the subject in
DOHSA 65 (limiting recovery to pecuniary damages), the Court was
to supplement the recovery through the general maritime
not free
law. 66 The trend to extend liability limitations was on. Thereafter,
60. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
61. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
62. Id. at 588-89.
63. 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
64. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
65. Of course, a similar sort of argument in Moragne itself might have gone
something like this: In DOHSA, Congress provided a wrongful death action to
the survivors of those killed on the high seas. In the Jones Act it provided a
wrongful death action to the survivors of negligently killed seamen. Congress
did not provide anyone else with a Jones Act action so it must have meant not to
do so. Thus, the Supreme Court should not do so. By creating the general
maritime law wrongful death action, the Court recognized the appropriateness of
developing and shaping maritime tort law to make it up to date, fair, logical,
consistent, and coherent.
66. Of course, an amendment to DOHSA that expressly made loss of
society damages recoverable in DOHSA cases would obviate any need to
supplement the DOHSA claim via the general maritime law or state tort law.
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in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,67 the Court refused to
allow the plaintiffs in a high seas death case to "borrow" state law
to supplement DOHSA recovery.6 8 The limitation trend continued.
Then, in Miles,69 the Court considered a case involving a
seaman killed in territorialwaters. In Miles, a seaman had been
brutally murdered by a bellicose fellow crew member, who
repeatedly stabbed the decedent. 7 0 The decedent's mother sued the
employer, alleging, among other things, a Jones Act negligence
wrongful death claim and a Moragne general maritime law
wrongful death action claim arising out of an unseaworthy
condition of the vessel (the presence of the bellicose seaman).7 1 In
a somewhat surprising decision, the Court refused to allow the
mother to recover her loss of society damages on the
unseaworthiness general maritime law wrongful death claim.7 2 The
Court reasoned that when Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920
and incorporated the FELA, it must have been aware of the
Vreeland decision-holding that the FELA did not authorize
wrongful death recovery for loss of society damages-and so
Congress must have incorporated that holding into the Jones Act as
judicial "gloss." 73 The Miles Court then reasoned that because
Congress supposedly did not intend to allow recovery for loss of
society damages in a Jones Act wrongful death claim for
negligence, such damages were not available in a general maritime
law (Moragne/Gaudet)wrongful death action where the death was
caused by an unseaworthy condition of the vessel. This was
because, the Court said, "[i]t would be inconsistent with our place
in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive
remedies in a judicially created cause of action in which liability is
without fault [unseaworthiness] than Congress has allowed in cases
of death resulting from negligence."7 4 The Miles decision was, of
67. 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
68. Id. at 217.
69. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id. at 21-22.
72. The reader will note that DOHSA did not apply to the case because the
wrongful conduct occurred in territorial waters, not the high seas.
73. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32.
74. Id. at 32-33. See generally David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in
U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. REV. 463 (2010).
An amendment to the Jones Act to allow recovery of loss of society damages in
Jones Act (and FELA) wrongful death cases would effectively supersede the
ruling in Miles as it would eviscerate its analytical foundation. Because
Congress supposedly did not authorize the recovery of loss of society damages
in the Jones Act, the Court should not do so in a seaman's survivor's general
maritime law wrongful death claim.
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course, arguably inconsistent with the spirit, if not the holding, of
Gaudet and Moragne, and scholars have criticized it." Moreover,
the Supreme Court has twice refused to extend the holding of
Miles in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend7 6 and Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Calhoun.7 7 Indeed, in Calhoun, the Court held that where
the decedent was a non-seafarer killed in territorial waters, his
for loss of society damages
survivors could use state law to recover
78
in a maritime wrongful death case.
However, despite the scholarly criticism of Miles and the
Court's own subsequent failure to extend the holding of Miles,
some lower courts have relied upon Miles, Tallentire, and
Higginbotham to limit recovery of nonpecuniary damages in
maritime cases that do not fall under those holdings.
For instance, in Scarborough v. Clemco Industries, the Fifth
Circuit said that loss of society damages were not recoverable in
any wrongful death action involving a seaman, even when the
claim was against a third party who was not the decedent seaman's
employer or the owner of the vessel on which he or she was
killed.79 Thus, the Fifth Circuit extended the holding of Miles to
claims (against third-party tortfeasors) that were not at issue in
Miles and that are not implicated in either the Jones Act or
DOHSA.
In Tucker v. Fearn, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit, again
relying upon Miles, held that the father of a minor killed in a
sailboat accident in Alabama's territorial waters could not recover
loss of society damages under the general maritime law.80 By
applying Miles to a case that did not involve a seaman or the Jones
Act, the court applied the decision beyond its holding to deny
recovery.
In Doyle v. Graske, the court relied heavily on DOHSA in
holding that general maritime law does not allow loss of
consortium recovery for the spouse of a non-seafarer (a nonseaman or non-longshore worker) injured, as opposed to killed, on
75. See John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime
Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249 (1993); Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of Seeking "Unformity" and "Legislative
Intent" in Maritime PersonalInjury Cases, 55 LA. L. REv. 745 (1995).
76. 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009) (recognizing a right to recover punitive damages
in case alleging the arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure).
77. 516 U.S. 199 (1995) (allowing the survivors of a non-seafarer killed in
territorial waters to rely on state law to seek recovery of loss of society
damages).
78. Id. at 202.
79. 391 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2004).
80. 333 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
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the high seas.8 1 Here the court relied upon a wrongful death statute
to limit recovery in a personal injury case that did not involve
wrongful death. That is, the court extended DOHSA's no-loss-ofsociety rule to bar recovery for loss of consortium where no death
had occurred.8 2 In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,83 the
court relied on Miles to deny recovery of punitive damages in a
case involving the alleged arbitrary failure to pay maintenance and
cure, which was not at issue in Miles. In doing so, the court clearly
extended the recovery-limiting holding of Miles beyond the
wrongful death context to a traditional maritime law claim.
Notably, in what might be read as a signal to all courts that
consider pushing Miles beyond its holding, the Supreme Court
abrogated the holding of Guevara in Townsend.84
Lower courts have disagreed on whether to extend Miles
beyond its holding. Some, in the spirit of a lower federal court
applying U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence but going no further to
"make law," have refused to extend Miles beyond its legislative
base and its holding. 8 But the fact that some courts have not
extended Miles beyond its holding and some have done so results
in inconsistency (there we are again-back to inconsistency).
Perhaps even more importantly, the fact that courts have extended
Miles increases the number of cases in which the law fails to
recognize the reality of injury and loss and in doing so either
totally fails to compensate for loss or, at best, undercompensates.
The extension of limited liability and undercompensation expands
the general climate of limited liability in maritime tort cases and
hence maritime disasters. It extends limitations on recovery
beyond the express reach of the Jones Act and DOHSA, and it
does so in reliance on the failure of those two statutes to allow
81. 579 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2009) (involving a boat passenger and spouse
who brought action in admiralty for personal injuries and loss of consortium
damages sustained in a boating accident off the coast of Grand Cayman Island
when the steering linkage disengaged); see also Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc.,
39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
82. See Doyle, 579 F.3d at 907.
83. 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995).
84. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009) (allowing
punitive damages).
85. See Kahumoku v. Titan Mar., LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Haw.
2007) (law entitles LHWCA worker to recover punitive damages in maritime
tort case); Clark v. W&M Kraft, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-00725, 2007 WL 120136
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2007) (loss of consortium recovery claim available for
seaman's spouse and son against third party); In re Consol. Coal Co., 228 F.
Supp. 2d 764 (N.D.W. Va. 2001) (loss of consortium recovery available for
seaman's spouse against third party); Rebardi v. Crewboats, Inc., 906 So. 2d 455
(La. Ct. App. 2005) (punitive damages available).
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recovery of nonpecuniary damages. The extensions of limited
liability increase the possibility of underdeterrence and, as
described more fully below, the potential for increased and
inefficient risk taking. Amending the Jones Act (actually FELA)
and DOHSA to allow recovery for loss of care, comfort, and
companionship would go a long way toward solving the problem
because the amendments would do away with the language upon
which courts have relied to limit recovery for bona fide damages
(for what most courts would consider nonpecuniary damages) and
thereby effectively increases risk.

IV. SURVIVAL

ACTION: PRE-DEATH PAIN AND SUFFERING

Additionally, shifting from the wrongful death claim to the
survival action claim, the Supreme Court in a case that did not
involve a seaman, Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 86 relied upon
DOHSA and refused to allow recovery of pre-death pain and
suffering as part of a survival action claim where death occurred
on the high seas. Concomitantly, the law does allow the Jones Act
seaman's survivors to recover for pre-death pain and suffering.8 7
So, we are faced with another glaring example of inconsistency.
Although Dooley does not apply to seaman survival actions, in any
case covered by Dooley, involving a death caused by events on the
high seas, no matter how much the decedent may have suffered
before his death, those damages are not recoverable. DOHSA does
not expressly deal with maritime survival actions, but only
wrongful death actions. To rely upon DOHSA to limit recovery in
an action to which it does not apply causes further
undercompensation, underdeterrence, and resulting increased risk.
To remedy this situation, Congress should amend the law not only
to make loss of society damages recoverable, as suggested above,
but also to makeepre-death pain and suffering available in maritime
survival actions."

86. 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
87. See David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in
Admiralty andMaritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, 32 TuL. MAR. L.J. 493 (2008). That the survivors of a Jones Act
seaman suing in negligence can recover for pre-death pain and suffering, but
survivors of other decedents cannot, is yet another example of inconsistency in
maritime wrongful death and personal injury law.
88. H.R. 5503 did so and S. 3463 proposed to do so but, as the reader
knows, the Senate has not acted on that bill.

DEA TH AT SEA

2011]

809

V. UNDERCOMPENSATION LEADS TO UNDERDETERRENCE AND
INCREASED RISK

Throughout this Article I have said that if tort law
undercompensates injured victims or their survivors then that
undercompensation will lead to increased risk. Here I will explain
the theoretical underpinnings of those statements, all of which are
based on simple economics and common sense. Critically, in terms
of holding people and industry accountable, if the law
undercompensates, it will by definition underdeter, which will lead
to lower than optimal investments in safety. Lower investments in
safety and accident avoidance lead to increased risk. This is true
because when deciding what to do and how to do it, the rational
economic actor will consider the costs of its activities. To the
extent that a person does not have to pay a cost, he is much less
likely to take that unpaid cost into account when deciding what to
do and how to do it. As Judge Guido Calabresi so ably noted many
years ago in The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis,8 9 one of the costs economic actors must consider is the
cost of accidents. The costs of accidents are just as real and
important as the costs of goods themselves, such as the costs of
raw materials and the costs of labor. The critical importance of
encouraging actors to take account of accident costs is also at the
heart of Judge Richard Posner's important law and economics
scholarship and jurisprudence on negligence. 90 This truism about
taking account of accident costs is the crux of Judge Learned
Hand's famous negligence formula that provides that one is
negligent if the burden or cost of avoiding a loss is less than the
probability of the loss occurring multiplied by the anticipated
magnitude (or value) of the loss, if the loss arises and the actor
fails to incur the burden, i.e., the costs of accident avoidance. Put
algebraically, per Judge Hand, one is negligent if B < P x L and the
actor does not avoid the loss by making the investment in safety.
Interestingly, Judge Hand originally articulated his famous and
influential negligence formula in a maritime tort case. 9 ' Basically
the notion of tort law forcing actors to internalize the costs of their
actions when determining what to do and how to do it is the core of
all law and economics jurisprudence and scholarship on torts.

89.

GuIDo

CALABRESI,

THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
90. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
29 (1972).
91. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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If a person does not take account of the costs of accidents when
deciding what to do and how to do it, he will underinvest in safety.
Of course, compensatory damages are based in corrective justice
and are designed to make the plaintiff whole-to put him in the
position he would have been in if the wrong had never occurred.
Professor Douglas Laycock has called it the "plaintiffs rightful
position." 92 The idea of compensatory damages, in and of
themselves, might seem irrelevant to optimal economic behavior.
However, compensatory damages also play another role in the
regulation of American tort law because tort law not only
compensates, but also deters unsafe conduct. And compensatory
damages play a critical role in deterrence. The threat of paying
compensatory damages in tort cases forces people to consider the
costs of accidents when making decisions about engaging in
behavior that might pose risk to others. As I have written
previously in this law review:
In addition to forcing actors to pay some accident costs,
compensation performs a second efficiency related
function. The tort system operates as a data bank providing
actors access to information on the number of accidents
that do occur, the damages that accident victims suffer, and
the dollar value of those damages. In this regard the "fault"
system facilitates actors' ex ante [beforehand] calculations
by providing them with the data they need to calculate the
value of the damages that their activities impose on others.
Given a large number of similarly situated actors, over time
damages paid might be expected to somewhat equal the
actual value ex ante of an activity's accident costs ... . But
in order for our current system to operate most effectively,
some real relationship must exist between the accident
costs society wants the actor to consider beforehand and the
damages we force the actor to pay after the fact. The
damages we award to compensate plaintiffs in personal
injury cases and the categories of accident costs we want
actors to consider ex ante should highly correlate. If actual
damages awarded in tort suits do not reflect the costs we
want actors to consider ex ante, but the system relies upon
those actual awards as a "definition" of accident costs, then
the system will not optimally deter. If the damages awarded
in tort suits are less than the total costs we want actors to
discount ex ante, we are encouraging people to consider
less than all of the costs of that activity and to overengage
92.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 15 (1st ed. 1985).
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in it. Likewise, if we overcompensate accident victims we
are encouraging actors to underengage in the activity.9 3
To reiterate, to the extent tort law does not adequately
compensate victims, it underdeters risky conduct and contributes to
a more dangerous world than people have a right to expect. And in
the maritime setting the law undercompensates because it does not
compensate victims for loss of society in cases involving the death
of seamen and others on the high seas (other than commercial
aviation disasters) and because courts have extended those norecovery rules to other maritime contexts. The failure to
compensate for loss of society in Jones Act and DOHSA cases is a
germ that infects the entire deterrence scheme of maritime
wrongful death and personal injury law. When extended to cases
that are not expressly governed by those statutes, it is a germ that
threatens to become a plague, a plague causing inefficiently high
levels of personal injury, death, and concomitant property loss;
economic damages; and environmental devastation. Maritime
disasters and oil spills that cause injury and death also cause
damage to property, the economy, and the environment. Those
damages devastate lifestyles, culture, and even global well being.
They harm everyone.
Moreover, there is evidence that environmental disasters can
have devastating mental health effects. 94 In natural disasters the
effects typically subside within two years, 95 but technological
disasters resulting from breakdowns by humans "consistently have
social, cultural, and psychological effects that are both more severe
and longer-lasting." The effects are particularly acute where the
disaster impacts renewable resource communities like fisheries. 9 7
These effects manifested themselves in the Prince William Sound
community in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill by causing
chronic feelings of helplessness, betrayal, and anger; high rates of
anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress; increased health
care demands; increased crime rates; and more.98 These injuries
93. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of
Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 25-29 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
94. See Brief Amici Curiae of Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law and
Economics Scholars in Support of Respondents, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471 (2008) (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 275482 at *8 [hereinafter Amici
Briefj.
95. Id. (citing Catalina M. Arata et al., Coping with Technological Disaster:
An Application of the ConservationofResources Model to the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill, 13 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 23, 24 (2000)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at *9.
98. Id. at*13-18.
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were very real, and absent some compensation or device to force
actors to consider them when deciding what to do and how to do it
(i.e., some device to hold them accountable), they will not be
forced to do so, tending toward underdeterrence and increased risk.
Although OPA 90 provides liability for removal costs, property
damage, economic loss, and more, it does not cure the problem of
undercompensation and underdeterrence in maritime personal
injury and wrongful death cases because it does not apply to
maritime personal injury and wrongful death cases. The
undercompensation resulting from the current state of maritime
personal injury and wrongful death law and the serious emotional
harm that can result from a maritime, environmental disaster is not
only unfair and inconsistent but also will potentially lead to
increased risk. These economic realities are exacerbated in the
maritime setting by the existence of the 1851 Ship Owner's
Limitation of Liability Act.

VI. LIMITATION

OF LIABILITY

The Limitation of Liability Act9 9 applies to these events.
Originally passed in 1851 to encourage investment in maritime
shipping and commerce, the Act allows a vessel owner (and some
others) to limit liability to the post-voyage value of the vessel if the
liability is incurred without the privity or knowledge of the
owner. 00 And the owner is entitled to retain any hull insurance.10o
One may justifiably wonder whether an act passed at a time before
the modem development of the corporate form (and other liability
limiting devices) and the evolution of bankruptcy law is still
salient; however, limitation is still extant as a matter of maritime
law. The vessel owner creates a fund equal to the post-accident
value of the ship (not including the hull insurance). The claimants
then share in the fund in proportion to the value of their claims.
Personal injury and wrongful death claimants share with other
claimants, but if the vessel is a seagoing vessel and the fund is not
adequate to provide the personal injury and wrongful death
claimants with recovery equal to at least $420 times the gross
tonnage of the vessel, the owner must provide the difference, up to
$420 per ton, but no more.102 Transocean, Ltd., the owner of the
Deepwater Horizon, has petitioned to limit its liability, and the

99.
100.
101.
102.

46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006).
Id. §§ 30505(a)(), 30506(e).
Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
46 U.S.C. § 30506(b) (2006).
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estimated value of the fund is $27 million.1 03 A full discussion of
the wisdom of limitation and its potential repeal or amendment is
beyond the scope of this Article; however, here it is important to
note that the possible existence of the right to limit liability, absent
privity or knowledge, increases the risk of undercompensation and
concomitant underdeterrence in maritime tort law.'0

VII.

MARITIME PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The undercompensation and underdeterrence resulting from the
dated, inconsistent no-recovery rules described above and the
Limitation of Liability Act might be alleviated by the availability
of punitive damages. However, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Baker 0 5 provided that punitive damages in many maritime tort
cases are limited to, or capped by, a 1:1 ratio between the punitive
damages awarded and the compensatory damages awarded. This
decision might thwart the efficient imposition of punitive damages
in maritime tort cases.
103.

Mark Long & Angel Gonzalez, Transocean Seeks Limit on Liability,

WALL ST. J., May 13, 2010, at A5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/

SBl0001424052748704635204575241852606380696.html.
104. One may question whether limitation, even if other nations recognize
the right to limit, is still sound policy. One may also ask why, if the purpose of
the Act is to protect American shipping, the law is still necessary in a world
where fewer and fewer seagoing vessels are American registered vessels.
Finally, one may argue that there may be some basis for limitation of cargo
claims where the risk of loss and the fact of limitation may figure in the bargain
the shipper and carrier strike. That argument is substantially weaker in the case
of the personal injury or wrongful death victim-particularly where the injuring
vessel is a third party tortfeasor, i.e., the defendant has no contractual agreement
or relationship with the injured or killed victims.
OPA 90 has its own liability limitation scheme, and the applicable limit on
liability for a responsible party, absent gross negligence, is $75,000,000. 33
U.S.C. § 2704 (2006). Although the Supreme Court has not considered the
matter, lower federal courts have held that the OPA 90 supersedes the limitation
act on OPA 90 claims. See, e.g., In re S. Scrap Material Co., 541 F.3d 584, 595
(5th Cir. 2008) (dicta); In re Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818 (1st Cir. 1997);
Gabarick v. Lauren Mar. (Am.), Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. La. 2009).
But, as noted, OPA 90 does not apply to personal injury or wrongful death.
Thus the Limitation of Liability Act is applicable in a maritime disaster to allow
a vessel owner to limit its liability for personal injury and wrongful death
claims. Clearly, this liability-limiting device can lead to drastic
undercompensation to the victims of maritime disasters. Repealing the relevant
portions of the Limitation of Liability Act would, of course, cure the problem of
undercompensation and underdeterrence in general. Again, as noted, H.R. 5503
repealed the relevant portions of the Limitation of Liability Act. Senator
Schumer's proposed bill, S. 3478, would also have done so, but the Senate has
not acted.
105. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
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Punitive damages are damages in addition to compensation that
are designed to punish and deter. They are only awarded where the
plaintiff has proven fault, compensatory damages are awarded, and
the plaintiff proves that the defendant's conduct was worse than
negligent, i.e., it was intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless.
So how could punitive damages potentially alleviate the
underdeterrence caused by undercompensatory damage awards?
It is common ground among legal scholars and economists
that inefficient behavior will not be deterred unless actors
are forced to internalize all of the costs associated with
their activities. Although adequate deterrence may
generally be achieved through an award of compensatory
damages, an award of punitive damages may be necessary
to achieve complete deterrence in cases in which
compensatory damages fail to fully account for the costs of
a tortfeasor's actions.?o0
The U.S. Supreme Court has twice in the last three years held
that punitive damages are recoverable under general maritime
law.' 7 After these two decisions, punitive damages are available in
seamen-related cases, given the holding in Townsend that a seaman
may recover punitive damages under the general maritime law
arising out of the arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance
and cure. Punitive damages have not been traditionally recoverable
in DOHSA cases. The scope of the seaman's right to recover
punitive damages and their availability under DOHSA will now be
the subject of future argument and litigation. Notably, however, the
potential absence of punitive damages in cases involving deaths for
which no recovery of loss of society or pre-death pain and
suffering, or neither, is available may inadequately deter those who
engage in activities that may cause injury or loss of life because it
can result in an undervaluing of human life and tragic ramifications
when it is lost.'0 8
Additionally, as noted, although holding punitive damages are
recoverable in maritime tort suits, the Court in Baker limited the
amount of punitive damages recoverable in many maritime cases
to a 1:1 ratio between the punitive damages awarded and the
compensatory damages awarded.109 Justice Stevens was among the

106.
107.
Exxon
108.
109.

Amici Brief, supra note 94, at *2.
See, e.g., Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009);
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
See Galligan,supra note 93.
Baker, 554 U.S. at 476.
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dissenters, and one of the reasons for his disagreement with the
majority was that maritime law was undercompensatory. 11 0
The majority noted that studies did not indicate a "marked
increase" in the frequency of punitive damages over recent
years."' It also noted that the dollars awarded had not grown over
time in real terms.112 And the Court pointed out that the mean ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages in the cases studied
was less than 1:1. 13 But the Court was apparently concerned with
the potential unpredictable "spread" between high and low punitive
awards, and it was that concern that prompted the decision to
generally limit the ratio of punitives to compensatories to 1:1.114
The Court apparently concluded that the data concerning the range
or spread raised questions about notice, fairness, and consistency.
The holding in Baker is actually relatively narrow. It does not
stand for the proposition that punitive damages in maritime tort
cases are always limited to a 1:1 ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages. Critically, the Court pointed out that the
case before it involved conduct that was worse than negligent but
not malicious." 5 It also noted that the activity was "profitless" to the
tortfeasor.11 6 Therefore, the decision and the capping ratio should
not apply to cases involving higher levels of blameworthiness
(malice) or "strategic financial wrongdoing."" 7
Whatever one might argue about cases to which the Baker 1:1
ratio should or should not apply, I am concerned that most lower
court judges deciding admiralty cases will apply the ratio to these
cases due to a concern about being overruled. If they do, the ratio
cap will then deprive a judge or jury of the traditionally available
ability to tailor a punitive award, within constitutional due process
limits,' to the particular facts of the case, including the level of
blameworthiness, the harm suffered, the harm threatened, the
profitability of the activity, and other relevant factors. Indeed one
wonders if the 1:1 ratio aspect of Baker would have been decided
the same way if another maritime environmental disaster had
occurred before the decision. But we will never know."l 9
110. See id. at 521 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
111. Id. at 498 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 497.
113. Id. at 498.
114. Id. at 499.
115. Id. at 510-11.
116. Id. at 511.
117. Id. at 510 n.24.
118. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
119. Senator Whitehouse's proposed bill, S. 3345, would have restored the
traditional ability to tailor a punitive award to the facts of the case by providing:
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf and the deaths of
the 11 workers killed in the explosion have forced American
maritime law to face up to a sad, unjust, outdated, inconsistent, and
dangerous truth: Recovery in maritime personal injury and
wrongful death cases is undercompensatory. The failure to allow
recovery of loss of society damages in seaman and high seas
maritime wrongful death cases (other than commercial aviation
disasters) is unjust, dated, inconsistent, and out of alignment with
current values. The rules are outdated because the majority
American rule today is that loss of society damages are recoverable
in a wrongful death case.
The Jones Act and DOHSA rules are inconsistent because what
survivors recover depends more on where their loved one died than
on the substantive aspects of the case. The survivors of an oil field
worker killed on land as a result of a tort are much more likely
under the majority rule to recover loss of society damages than the
survivors of an oil field worker killed on a rig on the high seas,
who will be denied that recovery. The survivors of an oil field

"[I]n a civil action for damages arising out of a maritime tort, punitive damages
may be assessed without reference to the amount of compensatory damages
assessed in the action." S. 3345, 111th Cong. (2010). The effect of the proposed
amendment would have been to increase the deterrent impact of punitive
damage awards in maritime cases. But, the Senate did not act.
Although the Supreme Court has never considered the issue, several courts
have held that punitive damages are not available under OPA 90. See, e.g., S.
Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P'ship, 234 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2000); Clausen
v. MIV NEW CARISSA, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Or. 2001); see also JAMES P.
ROY ET AL., BP DEEPWATER HORIzoN GULF OF MEXICO OIL POLLUTION
DISASTER, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: LAW, DAMAGES, AND PROCEDURE (2010),
available at http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xbcr/justice/JPR_-_BP_-_Prelim
Analysis.pdf. Those courts state that OPA 90 preempts maritime law, and
therefore punitive damages are not available in a case involving maritime law
and OPA 90. Interestingly, OPA 90 actually provides that it does not affect
admiralty or maritime law. 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (2006). Moreover, OPA 90 does
not provide that punitive damages are not recoverable; it is merely silent on the
subject. And two of the cases, South Port Marine and Clausen, were decided
before the Supreme Court's affirmation of the right to recover punitive damages
in Townsend and Baker. Indeed in Baker, the Court refused to find that the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006 & Supp. 2009), which was
silent on the subject of punitive damages, precluded the recovery of punitive
damages under maritime law. Baker, 554 U.S. at 489. Finally, OPA 90 does not,
as noted, apply to personal injury and wrongful death claims. Consequently, any
preemptive effect OPA 90 might have on punitive damages in personal injury
and wrongful death cases would seem to be limited and South Port and Clausen
merit reexamination.
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worker killed on a stationary platform are more likely, through the
application of state law, to recover loss of society damages than the
survivors of an oil field worker killed on a rig on the high seas,
who will be denied that recovery. The survivors of someone killed
in territorial waters (particularly a nonseafarer) are more likely to
recover loss of society damages under either state law or maritime
law than the survivors of anyone killed on the high seas. And
finally, the survivors of someone killed in a commercial aviation
disaster on the high seas will recover loss of society damages
whereas the survivors of anyone else killed on the high seas will
not. That is not justice; it is nonsensical legal tyranny.
The recovery-denying rules not only fail to compensate but
also inevitably lead to underdeterrence and increased risk because
economic actors do not have to take those risks into account in
deciding what to do and how to do it. Aggravating matters, some
courts have extended the Jones Act and DOHSA no-recovery-forloss-of-society-damages rules beyond the contexts in which they
arose. These extensions exacerbate the problems because they
increase the numbers of cases in which plaintiffs are
undercompensated. This, in turn, increases the cases in which
maritime actors need not take account of the full accident costs
their activities create when deciding what to do and how to do it. In
turn, the climate of liability limitation has grown and so has the
risk of resulting injury and death. The solution is simple-amend
the Jones Act and DOHSA. This risky state of affairs is aggravated
by the 1851 Ship Owner's Limitation of Liability Act, and the
potential positive effect of punitive damages is limited by the 1:1
punitive damages to compensatory damages rule of Baker. As
noted, amendment and reform are both possible and necessary.
In conclusion, the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico spurs a tragic
but necessary opportunity for our nation to reconsider our law and
to make it just. Congress should act to repair this unjust, outdated,
inconsistent, and dangerous state of legal affairs, and lawyers,
judges, and concerned citizens should take up the call and
convince our federal legislators to do just that.

